Human memories are malleable and often shaped by social interactions. Previous work has demonstrated that not only one's own goals, but also those of a task-partner can facilitate subsequent retrieval of goal-relevant lexical stimuli, known as the Joint Memory Effect (JME). We outline a social-epistemic account of the JME which proposes that this memory enhancement reflects humans' tendency to map out their interaction partners' knowledge states, leading them to cognitively prioritize information relevant to and selectively attended by their partner. This account predicts that the memory enhancement for partner-relevant words should be limited to contexts where task partners are required to process their targets in terms of meaning, instead of attending to a surface feature. Additionally, we predicted that facilitated recall performance for partner-relevant information would be accompanied by enhanced memory for the social context of that information, that is, participants should be able to link the remembered content to the agent acting on it. The results of four experiments support these predictions. We demonstrate that the JME emerges selectively, depending on which stimulus feature (word meaning or presentation color) is attended by the partner, and that it extends to (and may even depend on) memory for the social context of the targets. Prioritizing partner-relevant information in memory may be linked to processes involved in establishing and monitoring common ground.
Introduction
The way people remember events is shaped by social interactions. Social context can modulate processing at different stages of memory ranging from initial encoding (Eskenazi, Doerrfeld, Logan, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013) , through post-encoding exposure to information (Koppel, Wohl, Meksin, & Hirst, 2014; Meade & Roediger, 2002) , up to retrieval (Bietti, 2010; Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; Sjolund, Erdman, & Kelly, 2014) . Some of these modulations comprise detrimental effects on memory, reducing accuracy, creating false memories or preventing retrieval. However, social influences on memory may also promote and scaffold remembering on the level of dyadic interactions (e.g., Barnier et al., 2014; Wegner, 1987) , as well as on the level of large-scale groups (e.g. contributing to the emergence of cultures, Shteynberg, 2010 Shteynberg, , 2018 . In this paper we propose and provide evidence for a socialepistemic account, according to which humans pay specific notice to those aspects of the environment that are relevant to and attended by a co-actor, retaining them in memory for future reference.
As attention modulates how people represent their surroundings (Gibson & Rader, 1979; Serences & Yantis, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1987) , knowledge about a partner's attentional processes can be very useful in human social life (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Tomasello, 1995) .
On the one hand, humans can infer others' attention based on visible cues like gaze direction or body orientation (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992) . It has been shown that such cues have a modulatory effect on memory: People show improved memory performance for information cued by another person's gaze over non-cued information (Gregory & Jackson, 2018; Nie, Ding, Chen, & Conci, 2018) . On the other hand, visible cues may not always be sufficiently informative regarding an interaction partner's attention. In some cases, gaze direction fails to differentiate between attended and non-attended information, and so people need to rely on a different type of cue. As the focus of others' attention is largely determined by their current intentions (Serences & Yantis, 2006) , knowledge about a social partner's intentions may provide a window into the mental representations they form about that environment (Elekes & Király, 2019) . Let us illustrate this with an example. You are walking on the street next to a friend. There is a pedestrian approaching you with a thick wool scarf around their neck and a slice of pizza in their hand and your friend says: "That looks good!". Gaze direction does not allow you to differentiate between possible referents, so how could you tell what exactly the utterance referred to: the scarf, the pizza or some other information? Knowledge about your friend's intentions, i.e. that they have meant to buy a scarf for some time, may help you guide your interpretation towards the scarf even if you yourself happen to be hungry and are more interested in that slice of pizza.
Knowing which subset within a stream of stimuli is task-relevant for a partner leads participants to allocate more attention to (He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011) , and remember better the information that the partner attended to (Elekes, Bródy, Halász, & Király, 2016; Eskenazi et al., 2013; Wagner, Giesen, Knausenberger, & Echterhoff, 2017) . A study by Eskenazi et al. (2013) provided the first evidence for a memory advantage for a partner's targets without gaze-cuing. Pairs of participants watched a stream of words organized into three thematic clusters (e.g. animals, plants and objects), and were instructed to react to items belonging to a given semantic category. Therefore, all items were jointly observed and processed at the level of semantics, but different subsets of information were selectively attended, or prioritized by each member of the pair, leaving one category irrelevant to both of them. When faced with a surprise recall test later, participants showed higher rates of recall for the partner's targets compared to irrelevant words, which has been labelled the Joint Memory Effect (JME). Participants could also recall more items from the self-relevant category than the irrelevant category, in line with a large literature demonstrating that information associated with the self receives prioritization (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008) .
Several potential underlying mechanisms have been put forward to explain the JME. Eskenazi et al. (2013) argued that upon observing their partner's target items participants generate action plans similar to the ones elicited by their own targets, leading to enhanced memory for both types of items. However, Elekes et al. (2016) provided evidence for the JME in a task that did not involve motor actions. They proposed that co-representing the partner's task rule could yield a memory advantage by inducing a demanding task selection process (i.e. task selection conflict), as participants need to continuously prevent themselves from switching to their partner's attentional focus. Finally, Wagner et al. (2017) have shown that the effect depends on the level of perceived psychological distance to the co-actor, so that it gradually diminishes as psychological distance (manipulated by physical distance) increases.
Here we propose that the JME demonstrates people's propensity to cognitively prioritize those bits of information that their partner is most likely to selectively process due to their current intentions. This, in turn, may facilitate future interactions by making partner-related information more accessible in memory. We will call this the social-epistemic hypothesis. Tracing the JME back to the partner's goals, the socialepistemic account constitutes a Theory of Mind-like explanation as it assumes that the memory effect is driven by people's fundamental motivation to represent what is on others' mind and to keep track of others' knowledge states. However, picking out information that the partner represents does not necessarily have to be done in a mentalistic way. People can represent something as relevant to someone without ascribing attention to or knowledge about those stimuli to them as mental states; keeping track of what a partner is focusing on can be adaptive even in the absence of such rich understanding. 1 We derive two major predictions from our social-epistemic account of the JME. First, people should only demonstrate preferential processing of the partner's target words (semantic information) if those words are relevant to and represented by the partner in terms of their semantic content. The social-epistemic account proposes that the JME is caused by a process that gives cognitive priority to information that is most likely on the partner's mind, i.e. information that the interaction partner intends to process or is attending to. This likely emerges on the basis of humans' naïve understanding of attention (Elekes & Király, 2019) . Importantly, attention does not necessarily highlight information on an object-level, rather, it can be allocated selectively to a single object feature, like color, orientation or even semantic category disregarding other features (Cristescu, Devlin, & Nobre, 2006; Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Sàenz, Buraĉas, & Boynton, 2003; Serences, Schwarzbach, Courtney, Golay, & Yantis, 2004) . Assuming that the JME originates from humans' motivation to map out their partners' knowledge states, it should be limited to information that the partner is expected to encode according to their intentions, or task goals. Specifically, we expect that enhanced memory of the partner's target words will be limited to contexts in which the partner is assumed to attend to items for their meaning (as opposed to attending to them for their visual appearance, such as color). In this respect, the social-epistemic account's prediction diverges from those of the motor simulation (Eskenazi et al., 2013) and task selection conflict (Elekes et al., 2016) accounts, as these predict enhanced memory performance to any subset of words that requires a response from the task partner, regardless of the partner's intention to process semantics.
Our second prediction was that if the partner's task induces preferential processing of content, this should also be accompanied by improved memory for the link between the content and the agent acting on it, which we conceptualize as an instance of source memory. Source memory refers to being able to determine where certain mental representations come from (Shimamura & Squire, 1987) , or more generally, to remember contextual information that accompanied the content to be learnt (Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001) . We expect that humans' motivation to keep track of what is on others' minds will also lead to indexing those mental contents to individuals. On this basis, we predict that participants will not only recall more partner-relevant items than irrelevant items, but also, that they will be able to identify partner-relevant items as such more accurately.
Other lines of research predict relatively poor source performance (i.e., memory for acting agent) for partner-relevant items. Social influences on source memory often manifest as erroneous memories of having done or experienced something that, in fact, a fellow social agent did (Miles, Nind, Henderson, & Macrae, 2010; Sommerville & Hammond, 2007) . People erroneously self-ascribe motor actions that others performed (Lindner, Echterhoff, Davidson, & Brand, 2010; Lindner, Schain, Kopietz, & Echterhoff, 2012) , or memories they recalled (Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; Hyman Jr, Roundhill, Werner, & Rabiroff, 2014; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001) . Importantly, people specifically misattribute events to themselves that another social agent experienced or created. Consequently, in the JM paradigm, the self-other conflation that the above findings demonstrate should specifically lead to source memory errors for partner-relevant items but not for irrelevant items, as only the former are prone to misattribution to the self.
A similar prediction follows from Shteynberg's shared attention theory (Shteynberg, 2010 ) that aims to explain the JME as well (Shteynberg, 2015 (Shteynberg, , 2018 . The author proposes that humans engage in so-called shared attention states, in which they experience themselves and their partner(s) as a unified agent (we) with a single focus of attention, experiencing a plural and "irreducibly collective" psychological perspective (Shteynberg, 2018, p.93) . The prediction that follows is that people sharing attention with someone will encode the attended information more deeply without registering for which agent of the weunit (self or partner) the information was relevant, leading to a great number of source memory errors for self and partner-relevant items. To summarize, while the social-epistemic account predicts good source memory for a task partner's items, alternative theories predict poor performance based on self-other conflation.
Finally, to better understand the nature of the memory processes underlying the JME, we also tested whether the facilitation of partner-1 Findings based on the joint memory task (Eskenazi et al., 2013) cannot differentiate between mentalistic and non-mentalistic explanations of the effect and this issue falls outside the focus of the current paper. Our inquiries will be guided by the simple presumption that the memory benefit for the partner's targets reflects humans' propensity to map out their interaction partners' mental contents. This presumption remains agnostic as to whether those contents are represented as mental states.
relevant materials extends to performance in an item recognition task. Recall and recognition may be sensitive to social effects to a different extent. Thus far, there is only limited evidence for social modulations of item recognition. Specifically, the supposed presence of a co-attending individual has been shown to facilitate recognition efficiency (Richardson et al., 2012) . Shteynberg (2010) has demonstrated superior recognition performance for materials attended jointly with an in-group over an out-group partner. However, the JME (a selective memory improvement for partner-relevant items) has only been reported for free recall previously. It is possible that the free recall measure could reveal prioritization given to a task partner's items more clearly than item recognition. Although both recall and recognition require an active search in memory, the nature of free recall is such that people can use the idiosyncratic way they organized events at encoding to prompt remembering (e.g. along items' social relevance), while the same organizational structure is less likely to facilitate recognition (Tulving & Thomson, 1971) .
The social epistemic account is specifically formulated to explain the JME and does not yield predictions regarding the self or the selfpartner relation. Previous findings show a clear recall increase for selfrelevant items compared with irrelevant items in the JM paradigm (e.g. Eskenazi et al., 2013) . Whether self-relevant items are better remembered than partner-relevant items is less conclusive (Elekes et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2017) and this question falls outside the scope of our investigations. Other lines of research point out that incidental memory for self-relevant words is enhanced not only if participants encoded them in a self-referential manner (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995) , but also when those words had only inconsequential, temporary connections with the self (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010) . Effects of the self are manifest on both recall and recognition van den Bos et al., 2010) . On this basis we may expect the self-prioritization effect (memory for self-relevant items compared with irrelevant items) to emerge consistently across measures.
Experiment 1 -replication
As a first step, we set out to replicate the semantic categorization based JME in recall under the experimental conditions that we aimed to use in subsequent experiments. Additionally, we tested participants' memory for the words not only in a surprise free recall but also in an item recognition task. Based on extensive evidence on the self-prioritization effect , we predicted that self-relevant words would be better retrieved than non-relevant words both in a free recall and in a recognition context. Most importantly, we expected to replicate the JME in free recall, which should manifest as increased recall of the task partner's words compared to non-relevant items.
Methods

Participants
A total of 30 adult participants took part in the experiment (M age = 21.53 years, SD = 2.61 years, 25 females, 5 males). Participants were recruited individually and were randomly paired with another naïve participant. They did not know each other prior to the study. Participants received gift vouchers for their participation. The study was approved by the United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology (EPKEB) in Hungary.
Materials
We used three thematic lists of animal, plant and object names in Hungarian that were developed by Elekes et al. (2016) . Each list consisted of 30 items of 2 to 3 syllable-words belonging to the given semantic category. The items' average frequency of use did not differ between lists.
Procedure
Upon arrival participants were introduced to each other. After signing an informed consent, they were led to the testing room and were seated next to each other in front of an Asus ROG laptop. The procedure started by assigning a category (animals, plants, objects) to both participants, leaving one of the three categories unassigned. The third, unassigned category was counterbalanced between pairs. The remaining two categories were randomly assigned to the two people. The task was a go/no-go task. Participants were instructed to respond by key-press as quickly as possible whenever they saw a word belonging to their own category. No action had to be taken for items of the partner's category or for items of the unassigned category.
2.1.3.1. Exposure phase. The program randomly selected 15 items of each semantic category (animals, plants and objects) to be presented. Thus, participants encountered 45 of the 90 words during the exposure phase. The set of 45 distinct words was presented for a total of 4 times, with word order within the sequence re-randomized for each repetition. The number of repetitions was increased compared with previous works (Eskenazi et al., 2013) to promote incidental processing of lexical meaning in those subsequent experiments (Experiment 2, 3) where participants' task would not require such processing. The items were presented in white on a black background. The words were presented for a fixed, 1000 ms long interval. Each word was preceded by a fixation cross, and followed by a blank screen, both presented for 600 ms. Responses were recorded during the 1000 millisecond interval of stimulus presentation. The participants shared a keyboard, with the participant sitting on the left using the key "s" to indicate that they saw an item belonging to their own category and the participant sitting on the right using the key "l". Participants were asked to use their dominant hand and their hands were occluded from each other's view by cardboard boxes.
2.1.3.2. Test phase. When finished with the go/no-go task, participants were led to an adjacent room, where the memory test was administered to both of them individually. Participants sat at two separate tables at opposite sides of the room, with their backs to each other. The first task of the test phase was a surprise free recall test completed on paper, followed by a recognition test performed on two identical Asus ROG laptops.
2.1.3.2.1. Surprise free recall test. Participants had 3 min to put down all items they could remember from the exposure phase, regardless of item category. When the allocated time had elapsed, as a memory check, participants were asked to put down which category belonged to themselves, their partner, and which did not belong to any of them. Then, the experimenter collected the recall sheets and started the computerized recognition test for both participants.
2.1.3.2.2. Recognition test. Participants were presented with 90 words, one by one, written in white letters on a black background. Each word was preceded by a fixation cross and followed by a blank screen for 600 ms. Half of these items had been presented during exposure, the other half was new to the participants. Items were presented in a fully randomized order. Participants' task was to decide whether each item was old or new, and to be as accurate as possible. Words were presented until a response was registered. Participants responded by pressing the "c" and "m" keys on the laptop keyboard using the index fingers of their left and right hands. Key mappings (c/mold/new) were presented on screen throughout the test and were counterbalanced across participants.
2.1.3.2.3. Debriefing. At the end of the procedure, participants were asked to report whether they had expected a memory test (discrete answer possibilities: yes or no) and were then debriefed about the aims of the study.
Analyses
One participant and their partner were excluded from analyses due to an excessive amount of erroneous key presses in the exposure phase, leaving 28 participants in the sample (for more information see Supplemental materials). For both the surprise recall and the recognition measures, correct answers and false positives were analyzed separately (analyses on false positives are reported in the Supplemental materials). This was to create a procedure of analyses that could be maintained throughout subsequent experiments. Correct recall and correct recognition are expressed in percentage of presented words per Social Relevance (self, partner and irrelevant). One participant's data on the recognition measure was at chance (hit = 48%, false alarm = 53.33%) and was not included in the recognition memory analysis.
Memory performance was first entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Social Relevance (self, partner, irrelevant) as a within subject factor. The Main effect of Social Relevance was followed upon by planned paired samples t-tests testing the self-prioritization effect and the JM effect specifically (p values reported for the follow-up analyses are corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction). Bayes factors are reported for all pairwise comparisons testing the self-prioritization and joint memory effects (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009 ). All analyses reported in the main text are supplemented by the same analyses on the naïve subsample, that is, participants who reported not to expect a memory test. As the predictions of the social epistemic account were formulated for an incidental encoding context, findings from the naïve subsample address the predictions most directly (see Supplemental materials.)
Data for this experiment and subsequent experiments are available at: https://osf.io/y4pmu/ (see Elekes & Sebanz, 2020) 
Results
All participants could recall the category-agent rule accurately. Eleven out of 28 participants indicated that they expected a memory test.
Surprise free recall test
Social Relevance was found to have a significant main effect, F (2, 54) = 28.860, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.517. The follow-up analyses revealed that participants showed both a self-prioritization and a JME effect (see Table 1 ). They recalled more items from the self-category than from the irrelevant category, t (27) = 6.924, p < .0002 (BF = 81,559.17 for the alternative), and they also remembered more of their partner's targets compared with the irrelevant category, t (27) = 2.589, p = .030 (BF = 3.221 for the alternative).
Recognition test
Social Relevance had a significant main effect on recognition performance, F (2, 52) = 7.249, p = .002, η p 2 = 0.218. The planned follow-up analyses showed a significant self-prioritization effect, i.e., increased recognition of self-relevant words compared with irrelevant words, t (26) = 3.766, p = .002 (BF = 38.974 for the alternative), but no evidence for a JME, t (26) = 0.895, p = .758. A Bayesian t-test computed for the partnerirrelevant comparison provided evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no effect of the partner, BF = 4.679 for the null.
Discussion of Experiment 1
The findings of Experiment 1 provide evidence for a JME in recall: participants recalled more items that were task-relevant to their partner than irrelevant items. In contrast to earlier studies, we presented all items multiple times (4 times, 1000 ms each), instead of a longer (1500 ms) but less frequent (1 or 2 repetitions) presentation. The successful replication under these changed conditions allows us to move on to test the predictions derived from the social-epistemic account.
Additionally, to our knowledge, this is the first reported attempt to detect an advantage for partner-relevant verbal materials in recognition. The results did not provide evidence for any improvements in recognition of partner-relevant items, while a self-prioritization effect was observed in recognition. The results support previous findings on the dominant role of the self on information processing, leading to an enhanced encoding of self-relevant information .
Experiment 2non-semantic task
Results on the JME thus far suggest that lexical materials that are task relevant to a co-actor receive priority in cognitive processing along with words that are directly self-relevant. This, however, has only been tested in tasks where participants had to read and process the meaning of all presented items. Based on the social-epistemic account, we argue that processing semantic meaning may indeed be a crucial prerequisite of the JME.
The social-epistemic account proposes that the JME is the manifestation of humans' tendency to map out what is on their interactional partners' mind, what aspects of the environment they have knowledge of. Our theory presumes that humans have a naïve psychological understanding of how intentions shape perceptual experience through directing attention to task relevant information, which might be defined on a feature rather than on an object level. Therefore, we expect that people can use their knowledge of the task partner's task goals to predict what information they are processing in depth and will not allocate cognitive resources to those features of partner-relevant items which are not prioritized by them. That is, we hypothesize that social prioritization would only occur for information that the partner is in fact selectively attending to, i.e. for information that, being required for their task, the partner should have the intention to process.
The alternative possibility is that people would show enhanced encoding of any lexical item that is in some way associated with the partner's task or attention, even in the absence of the partner's intention to process lexical meaning. Such a finding should be expected if participants treated their partner's attention as a spotlight, leading them to give processing priority to objects (the words' physical representation on the computer screen, as a whole) that the spotlight fell upon. This pattern is also predicted by both the motor simulation (Eskenazi et al., 2013) and the task co-representation accounts of the JME (Elekes et al., 2016) .
Experiment 2 was conducted to test these predictions. Participants were assigned colors (red, blue and yellow) rather than semantic categories and were presented with words in one of three colors. Their task was to respond quickly to any word presented in their own color, and hence, the task could be performed without processing the meaning of the stimuli. As in Experiment 1, participants were tested for the lexical materials both in a free recall and in a recognition task. Furthermore, their memory for the social source of each item (for whom it was task-relevant) was also tested. Based on the social-epistemic account, we predicted not to find a JME under these conditions. However, due to the pervasive implicit effect of the self in cognitive processing (e.g. Kircher et al., 2002; , we expected self-relevant items to be remembered and identified better than irrelevant items.
To provide an even stronger test of our hypothesis that the JME depends on the partner's intention to process word meaning, we also F. Elekes and N. Sebanz Cognition 198 (2020) 104221 manipulated the internal semantic coherence of the sub-lists belonging to each participant. In the non-structured group, each color contained an equal amount of words from all three semantic categories (thus, both participants were responding to animal, plant and object names). In the structured group, there was a perfect correspondence of color and semantic category. Consequently, if for example red items were task relevant to one participant that also meant that they would be responding to, say, objects, throughout the exposure phase. That is, on a response or outcome level, the structured group of Experiment 2 did not differ from the semantic categorization task of Experiment 1. The crucial difference between the two experiments was whether participants intended to respond to color (Exp 2) or semantic category (Exp 1). 2 Thus, a lack of JME in the structured group of Experiment 2 would provide even stronger evidence for the social-epistemic hypothesis: information that is linked to the partner is only prioritized if the partner intends to process that information.
3.1. Methods
Participants
A total of 60 adult participants (M age = 23.41 years, SD = 4.15, 40 females, 20 males) took part in one of two groups, 30 participants per group. Individual participants were recruited and paired with another naïve participant. Participants received gift vouchers for their participation. The study was approved by the United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology (EPKEB) in Hungary.
Materials
The same materials were used as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with two modifications. First, participants were assigned a color, instead of a semantic category to respond to and second, they took part in a source memory task in addition to the recall and recognition test.
The task during the exposure phase was a go/no-go task where participants had to respond quickly and accurately to items presented in their own color (e.g. words written in blue). Again, the unassigned color was counterbalanced between pairs to avoid any confounding effect of any possible saliency difference between the chosen colors (red, blue and yellow on a black background). The remaining two colors were randomly assigned to the two participants in a pair. Participants were only informed about colors; the experimenter did not tell them that the words would belong to three different semantic categories.
3.1.3.1. Exposure phase. The script was identical to the one used in Experiment 1, except for the modifications in presentation color. Fifteen items of each semantic category (animals, plants and objects) were selected randomly to be shown during demonstration. The words were presented one by one in one of the three colors (15 items per color), on a black background. The presentation color of each word was kept constant over the four repetitions, that is, if a given word belonged to one participant's color based on its first appearance, it remained to do so on the subsequent repetitions.
Importantly, there were two groups, defined by the relation between semantic category and presentation color (see Table 2 ). In the non-structured group, presentation color and semantic category varied independently, as words from each semantic category were spread evenly across colors. In the structured condition, there was a one to one correspondence between the words' semantic category and presentation color, as all items of a category were presented in the same color.
3.1.3.2. Test phase. The test phase, including the surprise free recall and recognition tasks, was the same as in Experiment 1. Importantly, the items in the recognition phase were presented in white instead of their original presentation color (to avoid further exposure to the agency cue).
3.1.3.2.1. Source memory test. There was a separate source memory task at the end of the protocol. Participants were presented with the 45 old items again, in white color against a black background. Participants were told that they would only see items that were indeed presented during the demonstration phase, and they were asked to decide as accurately as possible who had to respond to the given item -they themselves, their partner, or no-one. That is, participants were required to make a source decision even for old items that they might have judged to be "new" in the recognition task. Each word was visible on screen till a response was given. Participants used the numbers 1, 2 and 3 to indicate self, partner, and no-one items, respectively. Key mappings were presented in the relevant colors ("self", "partner" and "no-one" written in red, blue and yellow corresponding to the color assignment of the demonstration phase) and they remained on screen throughout the source test. Note that in the structured group the source task could be solved by reasoning instead of source memory. Those participants who came to understand the color-category rule during encoding could answer the source question based on the presented item's semantic category, yielding higher accuracy than in the non-structured group.
3.1.3.2.2. Questionnaires. Participants were asked to indicate whether they had expected a memory test, and whether they had detected a relation between the words' meaning and color.
Analyses
Data for correct recall and correct recognition was coded the same way as in Experiment 1 (analyses on false memory performance is reported in the Supplemental materials). The source measure depicts the percentage of correctly identified source information (acting agent) per Social Relevance.
Following the analyses strategy used by the original publication of the JME (Eskenazi et al., 2013) , we ran separate mixed ANOVAs, testing the self-prioritization effect in a 2 (Social Relevance: self, irrelevant) * 2 (Semantic Structure: non-structured, structured) ANOVA, and the joint memory effect in a separate 2 (Social Relevance: partner, irrelevant) * 2 (Semantic Structure: non-structured, structured) ANOVA. Performing separate analyses for self and partner allowed us to test most directly how semantic structure affects the JME, which was our main goal in order to investigate the role of intentionality in the JME. Significant interactions were followed-up by planned t-tests, p values corrected for multiple comparisons. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used where the assumption of sphericity was violated. The same analyses were conducted on the 3 main dependent measures (recall, recognition, source memory).
Results
All participants accurately reported which color belonged to which participant. Fourteen and 11 participants out of 30 in the non-structured and structured groups, respectively, reported to have expected a memory test.
3.2.1. Surprise free recall test 3.2.1.1. Self-prioritization effect. In line with previous work, the effect 2 The structure manipulation can affect incidental encoding only in case participants in fact process the statistical correspondence between color and semantic category. Although participants' task did not call for semantic analysis, there is reason to expect that they would pick up the given regularity. Shaffer and LaBerge (1979) report that semantic categorization decisions are affected by the semantic category of unattended, distractor words. Findings in the domain of unsupervised statistical learning (e.g. Turk-Browne, Isola, Scholl, & Treat, 2008) show that people can infer regularities of the visual environment (e.g. correlation between stimulus color and shape) without intent or feedback and even unsuspecting that there is a regularity that can be uncovered, as long as they have a sufficient amount of attention allocated to the stimuli. of the self was significant on recall, with more self-relevant items recalled than irrelevant items, F (1, 58) = 65.853, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.532 (BF = 344,369,237 for the alternative). No other effects reached significance (p-s > .753) (see Table 3 ).
3.2.1.2. Joint memory effect. As predicted by the social-epistemic account, we found no evidence for the JME, i.e. there was no significant main effect of Social Relevance, F (1, 58) = 0.051, p = .822, η p 2 = 0.001 (BF = 6.91 favoring the null 
Discussion of Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, participants responded to the presentation color of lexical materials without being instructed to process the meaning of these words. As expected, we found a self-prioritization effect that was consistent over all three memory measures. Participants showed better memory for both the content (recall and recognition) and the source of their own items, even though their task merely called for responding to words of a certain color. This is in line with previous work, showing that people remember words presented together with a self-cue disproportionately well, even in the absence of an instruction to read or link the words to the self .
In contrast, semantic processing being unnecessary for their task, participants did not show enhanced memory for partner-relevant information on any of the measures. The data indicates that knowing that an object is relevant for a task partner in terms of its perceptual features (color) does not lead people to prioritize other properties of the object, not even such a pervasive property as its meaning. This finding supports the prediction of the social-epistemic account over alternative theories of the JME (in particular, motor simulation, task selection conflict, and the "attention as a spotlight" notion) which predicted a JME as long as the partner's task makes a well-defined subset of items relevant to them.
A further, stronger test of the social-epistemic account's prediction was established by the structured group where presentation color marked the boarders of semantic categories. In terms of the responses to be given, the structured group mirrored the original semantic categorization task: e.g. the fact that the partner was responding to blue items also meant that they were responding to, say, objects. Nevertheless, our results showed that Semantic Structure (structured vs. non-structured group) did not affect memory of the partner's items. The fact that the JME was absent under these conditions suggests that the partner's intention to selectively attend (respond) to a category is a prerequisite, while an accidental correspondence of attended feature (color) and semantics (category) is not sufficient. This finding further strengthens our conclusion that people only prioritize information that their partner is presumed to intentionally process. F. Elekes and N. Sebanz Cognition 198 (2020) 104221 4. Experiment 3semantic task
Thus far, we have obtained evidence that the partner's intention to attend to a category improves recall of partner-relevant information (Exp 1), whereas their intention to attend to a certain surface feature (even if it corresponds to category) does not (Exp 2). These two experiments differ in two theoretically relevant aspects: the need for semantic encoding on the one hand, and the type of the task distribution rule (semantic category or presentation color) on the other. The socialepistemic account predicts that what causally matters is semantic encoding. To confirm this, Experiment 3 tested the JME in a task context where items were assigned to participants based on presentation color, but making a response called for processing word meaning.
Participants were assigned a color to attend to and again colors either varied randomly within or mapped onto semantic categories (non-structured vs. structured group). However, instead of the simple detection task performed in Experiment 2, participants were instructed to make two-choice decisions, determining whether the valence of the words presented in their own color was positive or negative to them. This task called for semantic processing regarding one's own targets. At the same time, semantics were not part of the task distribution rule itself, that is, the words' meaning was not relevant for deciding whether or not a given item belonged to the self.
If the crucial component of the JME is the partner's intention to process word meaning, memory performance for the partner's targets should be enhanced as long as participants have a reason to assume that their partner reaches semantic understanding of their target items. The type of cue that indicates which items are relevant to the partner should not influence this prediction. Therefore, in contrast with Experiment 2, in Experiment 3 we predicted a JME on free recall, accompanied by a similar facilitation for the partner's targets on the source measure. We expected that the JME might be more pronounced in the structured group, because there semantic category provides an additional cue towards agency in addition to color.
Methods
Participants
A total of 60 adults (M = 23.58 years, SD = 3.77, 46 females, 14 males) participated in either the non-structured group or the structured group, 30 people per group. The experiment was started but aborted for an additional pair in the non-structured group due to experimenter errorthis partial set of data was not included in the analyses. Participants received gift vouchers for their participation. The study was approved by the United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology (EPKEB) in Hungary.
Materials
Materials were the same as in Experiment 2.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, except that participants' task during the exposure phase was to decide whether any item presented in their own color seemed positive or negative in valence to them. The participant on the left used the 'a' and 's' keys to respond while the participant on the right used '5' and '6' on the same keyboard's numpad (key-mappings counterbalanced between pairs).
Analyses
One participant and their partner were excluded from analyses in the non-structured group due to a high number of erroneous key presses in the exposure phase, leaving a sample of 28 participants in that group (for more information see Supplemental materials). All analyses regarding the test measures followed the protocol described in Experiment 2.
Results
All participants could recall the colorparticipant assignment rule correctly. Nine participants of each group expected a memory test.
4.2.1.
Surprise free recall test 4.2.1.1. Self-prioritization effect. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Social Relevance, with higher recall of self-relevant items, F (1, 56) = 400.618, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.877, and an interaction of Social Relevance and Semantic Structure, F (1, 56) = 5.380, p = .024, η p 2 = 0.088, but no significant main effect of Semantic Structure (p = .416, see Table 4 ). Follow up t-tests performed to clarify the interaction showed that the self-prioritization effect was present in both groups, non-structured, t (27) = 14.602, p < .0002 (BF = 267,259,559,725 for the alternative), and structured, t (29) = 13.589, p < .0002 (BF = 165,069,827,050 for the alternative).
Joint memory effect.
We found a significant JME as reflected in the main effect of Social Relevance, F (1, 56) = 5.367, p = .024, η p 2 = 0.087 (BF = 1.787 for the alternative). 3 There was also a significant main effect of Semantic Structure, F (1, 56) = 15.556, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.217, due to higher rates of recall in the structured group. However, Semantic Structure did not interact with Social Relevance (p = .742). That is, although the internal semantic structure of the sub-lists facilitated encoding in general, it did not influence the emergence of the JME. Participants were also more accurate in the structured group where semantic category was predictive of social relevance, F (1, 3 Note that the Bayes factor for the same comparison is 7.033 favoring the alternative in the naive sub-sample, providing substantial evidence for the JME. As hypotheses were formed regarding incidental encoding, data in the naïve sample speaks to our predictions with more scrutiny.
F. Elekes and N. Sebanz Cognition 198 (2020) 104221 56) = 11.924, p = .001, η p 2 = 0.176. Furthermore, there was an interaction of these two factors, F (1, 56) = 16.022, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.222. Follow up t-tests show that the self-prioritization effect was present in both groups, non-structured, t (27) = 10.293, p < .0002 (BF = 128,504,511 for the alternative), and structured, t (29) = 2.941, p = .012 (BF = 6.613 for the alternative).
4.2.3.2. Joint memory effect. The JME was present in the source responses, reflected by the significant main effect of Social Relevance, F (1, 56) = 10.153, p = .002, η p 2 = 0.153 (BF = 11.732 for the alternative). That is, participants were more likely to correctly identify their partner's targets as belonging to the partner, than they were to identify irrelevant items as belonging to no-one. Additionally, participants were more accurate in the structured group, F (1, 56) = 22.357, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.285. While performance was generally higher in the structured group, there was no significant interaction with Social Relevance (p = .332).
Discussion of Experiment 3
In this experiment, the task distribution rule was still based on stimulus color, however, participants had to make subjective judgments about the valence (positive/negative) of each word presented in their color. Under these conditions, the JME reappeared in the recall pattern in addition to the self-prioritization effect. These findings confirm that people preferentially remember the lexical content of their partner's targets when the partner's task calls for semantic processing of these targets. On the other hand, the data also suggests that while the type of required processing is relevant for the emergence of the JME, the type of the cue that defines agent-relevance is not. The JME for lexical materials may emerge even when agent-relevance is based on a surface feature, like color. This is in line with the predictions of the socialepistemic account, which presumes that the JME requires the partner's intention to process word meaning, regardless of other features of the task, like the task-distribution rule.
We aimed to also explore whether the facilitation in memory performance for the partner's targets would extend from free recall to recognition. Similarly to Experiment 1, we found no clear evidence for enhanced recognition of the partner's items beyond anecdotal evidence. Also, when limiting our analyses to the naïve subsample (those participants who reported that they did not expect a memory test, see Supplemental materials) a JME failed to emerge in recognition. This is noteworthy as, on the recall and source measures, the naïve subsample showed a more pronounced JME. It might be the case that high performance on recognition overall reduced the sensitivity of this measure.
An important addition to prior knowledge on the JME is provided by our findings on source memory. Experiment 3 provides evidence that the benefit for one's own and the partner's items in terms of recall of lexical content is also manifested in memory for the context of that content. Although source memory performance was above chance for all three sub-lists based on Social Relevance, a clear JME and selfprioritization effect was observed. This confirms our prediction that partner-relevant information is indexed to the partner, so that the social relevance of partner-relevant items is retained in memory. In our account, this finding indicates that information relevant to the self and information relevant to the partner was kept separate and encoded as relevant to one or the other, contradicting predictions of self-other confusion (Lindner et al., 2010; Shteynberg, 2018) . However, it could also be argued that participants simply recalled the color of the words at test rather than the agent acting on them. We conducted an additional experiment to rule out this possibility.
Experiment 4semantic task with source memory for color
The aim of Experiment 4 was to tease apart two possible explanations of the source memory findings obtained in Experiment 3.
Specifically, in Experiment 3 the source information in the exposure phase was constituted of both agency and color, because color specified who was supposed to act. It is, therefore, unclear whether participants remembered that their partner had responded to certain items because they remembered that it had been their partner's turn or because they remembered the items' color. To tease apart these possibilities, in Experiment 4 we tested whether participants would prioritize the presentation color of self and partner-relevant items (source memory for color) when that information was not socially relevant. Similarly to Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 4 were assigned semantic categories, and their task was to press a key for each item of their own target category. The presentation color of the items varied randomly within each category and color was irrelevant for participants' task. After the semantic categorization phase, participants took part in a free recall test, a recognition test and a source memory test. In the source memory test, participants' task was to decide which color the given item had been presented in during demonstration.
The social epistemic account presumes that facilitated source memory performance in Experiment 3 was due to participants encoding for whom each item was relevant instead of remembering color per se. On this basis we predicted that participants in Experiment 4 would not show a source memory enhancement for self and partner-relevant words, although they would recall these words more successfully than irrelevant words.
Methods
Participants
A total of 30 participants (M = 22.1 years, SD = 4.18 years, 21 females, 9 males) were recruited individually and paired with a fellow participant from the sample. An additional 2 pairs of participants were excluded due to their failure to report the categoryparticipant assignment rules correctly. Participants received gift vouchers for their participation. The study was approved by the United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology (EPKEB) in Hungary.
Materials
The word lists were identical to those in Experiment 1 and were presented in the colors used in Experiment 2.
Procedure
This experiment followed the procedure of Experiment 1, where participants were assigned a semantic category to attend and respond to. However, similarly to Experiments 2-3 the presentation color of the words varied (red, blue and yellow). Words from all three categories appeared in the three colors at equal frequencies. Presentation color remained the same throughout the four repetitions of each item. Participants were not informed about the different colors, they were only informed about the semantic categories and the category-agent rule.
The test phase included recall, recognition and source memory tasks in the same manner as in Experiments 2-3. However, in this experiment the source question targeted the demonstration color of the word (which varied independently from the agent who was required to act on the item). During the source memory test phase, participants saw words presented in white against a black background. Below, they saw three circles, one in each presentation color along with the button to be pressed (1, 2, or 3) to indicate the given color. The position of the colors was randomized between participants, and the key-mappings remained on screen throughout the source memory test phase.
Analyses
Coding and analyses followed the procedure reported in Experiment 1.
Results
Ten participants out of 30 indicated that they expected a memory test.
Surprise free recall test
The repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Social Relevance, F (2, 58) = 8.373, p = .001, η p 2 = 0.224 (see Table 5 ). According to the planned pairwise comparisons, participants recalled more self-items than irrelevant items, t (29) = 3.572, p = .002 (BF = 27.009 for the alternative). However, there was no difference between recall rates for the partner's category and the irrelevant category, t (29) = 0.596, p = 1.00. The lack of JME was confirmed by a Bayesian t-test (BF = 4.366 in favor of the null).
Recognition test
Social Relevance had a significant main effect on recognition, F (2, 58) = 10.554, p < .0001, η p 2 = 0.267. Participants recognized more of their own items than irrelevant items t (29) = 4.325, p < .0002 (BF = 165.687 for the alternative), but no difference was found between the partner's items and the irrelevant items, t (29) = −0.278, p = 1.00 (BF = 4.96 in favor of the null).
Source memory test
The repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant effect of Social Relevance on the source memory measure, F (2, 58) = 0.457, p = .636, η p 2 = 0.016. Collapsed over Social Relevance the accuracy of source decisions was found to differ from chance, t (29) = 2.537, p = .017. Participants showed a 37.4% success rate against the chance level of 33.3%.
Discussion of Experiment 4
Experiment 4 showed that facilitated recall performance of self-relevant words is not accompanied by enhanced source memory if the source information consists of a non-social object property (color). Although participants showed a clear self-prioritization effect both on the recall and the recognition measure, they could not identify the source information better for the self-items than they did for the irrelevant items (for a similar finding see Constable, Rajsic, Welsh, & Pratt, 2019) . Also, source memory accuracy in Experiment 4 was overall lower than in both Experiment 2 and 3, where color had social significance. These findings suggest that the presence of the self-prioritization and JME effects on the source measure in Experiment 3 were causally linked to the nature of the source information, namely, agency or social relevance. It seems that preferential encoding of source information only accompanies the encoding of the content when the source information constitutes socially relevant knowledge.
Surprisingly, even though the categorization task required processing all items at the level of semantics we found no JME in Experiment 4. Given that the JME was replicated using a semantic categorization task in Experiment 1, this finding does not diminish the robustness of the effect but rather points to an unexpected boundary condition. Previous studies on the JME did not vary perceptual surface features of the presented words. Color presents more easily accessible information than the word's meaning or its semantic category inferred from meaning. By presenting words of all three semantic categories randomly in three different colors we created a salient perceptual similarity between the categories. This perceptual similarity might have made it harder for participants to focus their attention on self-relevant items and might have resulted in more attention capture for the other two categories (partner and irrelevant). These findings indicate that the effect of the implicit social mechanism behind the JME can be eliminated or masked by salient physical characteristics of the attended stimuli.
General discussion
The social epistemic account of the JME presumes that the memory facilitation for partner-relevant words originates from humans' motivation to trace their task partners' epistemic states. We predicted that participants would only show facilitated recall of the partner's target words if they have reason to believe that their partner attended to these words in terms of their meaning. This was tested by manipulating whether participants' task called for semantic processing (Experiment 1 and 3) or not (Experiment 2). Our results demonstrate that when participants' task required processing items at the level of semantics, enhanced recall performance was observed for the partner's targets. However, when semantic analysis was unnecessary for the completion of their task, participants did not show enhanced recall performance of their partner's target words.
This selectivity of the JME cannot be explained by either the motor simulation or the task selection conflict accounts. Both alternative theories expect a JME to occur regardless of the way the task partner processes target items, as long as motor responses are performed upon seeing the targets (simulation account) or as long as there is a clear task distribution rule specifying which target is task-relevant to whom (task selection conflict account). Similarly, we should have observed a JME in all experiments if the other's attention was treated as a spotlight, indiscriminately enhancing the processing of information within the spatial focus of the spotlight. Rather, the selective emergence of the JME is compatible with the social-epistemic account, which expects participants to only prioritize information that is, in fact, important with regard to the partner's goal and current attentional focus.
A second prediction we derived from the social epistemic account was that information receiving enhanced processing for being self-or partner-relevant would also be "indexed" to these social entities. Presuming that the mechanism underlying the JME served the social function to explain fellow individuals' behavior, the enhanced memory for content should be accompanied by accurate memory regarding the agent to whom the given bit of information was relevant. In line with this prediction, our findings demonstrate that participants not only recalled more self and partner relevant words than irrelevant words but also identified them as self -or partner-relevant more successfully than irrelevant items. The current results, hence, present clear evidence that knowledge about the partner's current goal leads to enhanced memory for the partner's targets without driving participants to confuse their own items with those of the partner. Processing the partner's targets in depth did not come at the cost of increased source memory errors compared with the irrelevant items, as predicted by empirical and theoretical work on the influence of social context on source memory (Lindner et al., 2010; Miles et al., 2010; Shteynberg, 2010) . It is an interesting question for future research how agency information is stored in memory for items that are jointly relevant to participants, and how increased interdependence between tasks or interpersonal coordination might affect self-other confusion.
The findings of Experiment 4 provide boundary conditions for the observed effects. With regard to source memory, we found that when presentation color did not carry socially relevant information, participants' memory for color was poor and did not parallel their recall performance for the words. This is in line with results by Constable F. N. Sebanz Cognition 198 (2020) 104221 et al. (2019) , showing that a shape's relevance to oneself does not lead to better memory for the shape's perceptual properties, like its color. Our findings suggest that the social relevance of observed information has special significance amongst different kinds of contextual information. Against our predictions, we found no JME in Experiment 4. This finding points to the effect's sensitivity to salient perceptual characteristics of the stimuli. In addition to testing the predictions of the social-epistemic account, our experiments also assessed whether the JME previously reported for free recall would extend to item recognition. Existing evidence only shows that the (assumed) presence of a task-partner at encoding (Richardson et al., 2012) and the group membership of the co-attending partner (Shteynberg, 2010) can modulate the recognition of jointly observed stimuli. However, whether the relevance of information to the task partner would selectively influence recognition within a set of jointly observed items had not been tested before. Our results did not provide any evidence for enhanced recognition of the partner's items in the full sample of participants. We also analyzed the sub-set of participants who reported not expecting a memory test, and hence, were less likely to strategically memorize words during encoding. Although the JME in recall was generally more pronounced in the naïve sub-sample, it did not emerge in item recognition in this set of data either. Note, however, that recognition performance was close to ceiling, which may have reduced the sensitivity of this measure. Additionally, the fact that participants performed the recall test prior to recognition could have biased the results in ways unknown. Therefore, a possible avenue for further research would be to reduce the number of repetitions during the exposure phase and test recall and recognition performance between subjects.
In contrast with the JME, the self-prioritization effect was found across all experiments (regardless of instructed semantic encoding) and across all memory measures, including recognition. Several routes had been proposed through which the self could deepen incidental encoding, from affiliative processes (Zajonc, 1980) , through a dedicated self-memory system (Conway, 2005) , self-referencing, elaboration (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995) and sense of ownership (Cunningham, Brady-Van den Bos, & Turk, 2011) , to heightened attention (SAN, Humphreys & Sui, 2016) . The experiments reported here were not designed to tease apart these possibilities; in fact, several of these processes may have contributed to the observed effects. It could be tempting to speculate that whatever processing participants inadvertently performed on self-relevant materials was extended to partnerrelevant materials to some extent, thereby causing the JME. As the current paper set out to test the boundary conditions of the JME, the way in which the self and partner effect relate to each other falls outside the scope of this study. However, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that the self-prioritization and JM effects emerge from different sources. First, the pattern of self-and partner-effects differed in several ways: in Experiment 2, where semantic processing of the words was not required by the task, participants showed increased recall of their own words compared to the irrelevant words, but not of the partner's words. Recognition was improved for self -relevant items, but not for partner items. Furthermore, the source memory findings demonstrate that participants remembered their partner's targets as being relevant to the partner, which speaks against the self having been extended to the other. Future work is needed to directly compare the processes involved in boosting memory for self and other.
An alternative to the social epistemic account may present itself if task relevance is interpreted in terms of ownership. Participants were told to respond by keypress to items that belonged to their own category or color, potentially activating a sense of ownership. It is known that items owned by the self in a given experimental context are remembered better than items owned by an imagined third party (Turk et al., 2013; van den Bos et al., 2010) . Also, people have been shown to remember ownership relations between fellow individuals and objects over non-ownership types of relations (DeScioli, Rosa, & Gutchess, 2015), suggesting that representing items as owned by the partner could potentially lead to both increased recall and source memory performance. While the consistent effect of the self across experiments and memory measures may, in fact, originate in the sense of ownership, this explanation cannot account for our findings on the JME: Participants exerted the same extent of ownership over their targets in Experiment 2, where we found no JME. In summary, our findings are most consistent with the social-epistemic account, proposing that humans preferentially remember information that is most likely to be represented by their partners.
The pattern of results for the different memory measures may shed some light on the cognitive underpinnings of the JME. We suggest that the recall based JME may in fact be rooted in participants' tendency to preferentially store source information for partner-relevant targets (compared to the irrelevant items), providing an aid for retrieval that can be harvested in the free recall but not in the recognition task. In free recall, participants apply self-generated contextual cues to search their memories (e.g. semantic, temporal or source cues, Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009 ). Social relevance provided highly salient external structure to the presented materials during the exposure phase, therefore it could have served as a prompt for participants in the recall test. As contextual encoding was better for self and partner-relevant items than for irrelevant items, the prompts "self" and "partner" probably yielded hits (recall) more efficiently than the latter. On the other hand, the recognition task forced individuals to use the central element of the episode, the word itself, as a prompt for memory search (Tulving & Thomson, 1971) , so recognition could not benefit from preferentially stored source information about the partner's targets in the way recall did (Parks & Yonelinas, 2015) . In the naïve sub-sample of Experiment 2 we find indication for a memory enhancement for partner-relevant items in the source responses without a similar increase in recall, suggesting that memory for social source information might, in fact, be the primary contributing factor to the Joint Memory Effect.
A further interesting question concerning source memory is how the findings on the source measure may be related to episodicity. Episodic memories differ from other forms of declarative (verbally accessible) memories for having a temporal-spatial context and potentially a subjective, first person experiential nature (Tulving, 1972) . The advantage for partner-relevant items in source memory indicates that the partnerrelevant items were indeed encoded differently, involving a wider contextual background than irrelevant words. This may either result from storing multiple components of the presentation episode (agent and content) as a coherent unit (Parks & Yonelinas, 2015) , or from participants' ability to retrieve the relation between separate memory components (Eichenbaum, 2004) .
We have argued that, in their attempt to map out the content of interaction partners' knowledge states, humans expect others to cognitively prioritize information that they will likely be attending to. In line with this notion, we have shown enhanced memory for a task partner's items both in free recall and for memory concerning the agent to whom the item was relevant. This phenomenon may contribute to the success of social interactions even if it is realized in a non-mentalistic way. For instance, upon hearing an ambiguous reference to an object, the individual may be primed for the intended referent if information that was previously attended by the communicative partner is more accessible in memory. Such sensitivity to others' mental contents may enable humans to identify differences and commonalities in knowledge states and might contribute to establishing common ground (Clark & Marshall, 1981) . 
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